What’s Wrong with the World

I'm currently in the pre-theology program at a major seminary in the western United States, which means it's all philosophy all the time. It's probably a sign that I don't have a philosophical mind, but when I read non-Thomistic philosophers - particularly from Descartes onward - it's like watching someone grab hold of an error and run it into the ground. I often wonder about their sanity (in Nietzsche's case though it was definitely the syphilis.) Fortunately, the department is made up of enthusiastic Thomists who know other philosophies well enough to teach them accuately while intelligently criticizing them.

let us first imagine man thus, and then begin our study of his politics.

Well, I would simply point out that there is more both to Thomism and to modernism than a discussion of man's politics. One can pick and choose, to some degree, at least from the moderns. How much one is allowed to pick and choose from Thomism I leave it to the Thomists to decide.

Quite true, Lydia. If there is any "grid" I'm forcing the discussion through, it is the grid of political philosophy. (Naturally enough, I think: it's what I studied.)

I think Mr. Cella already identified it, St. Thomas is "one of the greatest philosopher-saints".
How many modern philosophers are saints? It's a pretty short list, in fact many of the most influential philosophers of the modern era have been notorious for their lifestyles (Sartre or Paul Tillich come to mind right away).
This is not an ad hominem but is in line with Thomist epistemology itself - sin (especially sins connected to the lower appetites like sex) makes one stupid.

Kevin,
In your "pre-theology program at a major seminary," have you examined the difference between theology and philosophy, or do you think that theology is simply philosophy you do concerning God? Further, to this point you seem to have determined that Aristotle's is the best of the countless competing philosophies, or perhaps the closest to Christianity. If so, why (especially since Christianity is not a philosophy)? If you have not so determined, why not? Does it bother you that neither Christ, nor the prophets, nor Peter, nor Paul, were Aristotelian, in particular, or formal philosophers at all, in general? That fact strongly concerns me about "all philosophy all the time" as a suitable entree into theology.

Kevin V,
Could one be a wonderfully insightful theologian and a truly pious man without following Aristotle? Could one be a remarkably good theologian and be a rather bad man? (Here I think both of the profundity of Paul, the "chief of sinners" and of David's Psalms.) If so, what's the point of trumpeting Thomas's piety and philosophy, neither of which are therefore determinative of, or necessary for, a really good theology? (Indeed, the latter might actually get in the way?)

Paul,
Barth demonstrated the futility of a natural philosophy or, in this case, a political anthropology, that begins, (like yours and Thomas') apart from the revelation. I simply commend Barth's case to you, the refutation of which I have never seen. Believe me, I wish things were different on this point. But, so far as I can see, they are not. If you are convinced they are, I'd like to hear the case.

I'm not sure where you have heard me say something against the proposition of that it is futile to begin a "natural philosophy" or "political anthropology" "apart from the revelation." I don't know if St. Thomas would deny it either. Remember the legend at his death?

I guess there could be a lot to unpack in the word futility.

My reading of Genesis suggests to me that man in his original created state would have something more than a futile natural philosophy; that, indeed, his natural faculties would be fruitful. Perhaps we should say that sin diluted and corrupted it; but we cannot say that it destroyed it utterly.

What puzzles me is why you should be lecturing me on this point. My whole beef with the moderns is their attempts to ground political philosophy on sheer materialism; their flailing around in self-imposed futility; in a word, their posited atheism.

I am also puzzled by your several instances of hinting that other commenters subscribe to the view that a man cannot be insightful or pious "without following Aristotle"? Huh?

Paul,
I's not a very careful reading of anything I said when a commendation is turned into a lecture, and when questions asking for clarification are made into hints.

So let me be clear, I am suggesting that there is a significant difference between theism and Trinitarianism that is lost when philosophy displaces theology as a Christian's tool of analytical preference for things like political and social thought. (One has not escaped simply by rejecting contemporary materialism.) I think, if we look closely enough at what they write, that the loss of the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Incarnation would have no significant effect upon the political or social thought of most Christians -- Thomas included. They too often say such things matter, and then then theorize as if they do not. The loss of Aristotle would change everything for them; the loss of a distinctly biblical content changes their thought almost not at all.

Enough W4 for me.

I was going to excerpt this, but instead I'll just link to it.

"So let me be clear, I am suggesting that there is a significant difference between theism and Trinitarianism that is lost when philosophy displaces theology as a Christian's tool of analytical preference for things like political and social thought."

Clearly, the person who had commented thus has either little or no understanding whatever concerning Aquinas or, perhaps better yet, has hardly read any of his works (if at all).

How a person could actually demonize Aquinas in such a blatantly treacherous manner as this and with such utter mendacity (reducing his corpus to nothing more than pagan "theism") is beyond me, the very man who preached so profoundly the genuinely Christian message -- as made evident by many of his notable, scholarly works -- very much consistent with the Gospels that "man's ultimate end is found in the Christian God and not in any such worldly knowledge" (which latter, ironically, was an allusion to a knowledge of Aristotle since Muslim scholars at the time, who actually possessed & expertly studied his works, complained that Catholicism -- mind you, centuries before there was ever even such a thing as Protestantism -- contradicted certain Aristotelian precepts and, therefore, those in the Church cannot be truly considered as Aristotelian devotees (as if the philosophy of Aristotle should be the determining force that must dictate the doctrines of the Church -- this might very well be why even the Popes of that period even went so far as banning through various papal pronouncements the works & teaching of Aristotle altogether in several, and later all, the universities in order to curb any such overly zealous devotion to his philosophy as this), to which Aquinas himself fiercely argued the more significant & monumental point that it is the Truth itself that the Church is devoted to and not Aristotle.

More precisely, the Angelic doctor taught with such fervent fire for the Faith & God:

"Our knowledge of this world is not an end in itself. Our knowledge of this world should lead us and direct us to God and, ultimately, our knowledge in this world of God is a very hazy, shadowy knowledge of God."

Reminds you of anybody?

Paul of Tarsus perhaps?

Such as when Paul himself had said in Corinthians:

"Now we see in a mirror darkly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I have been fully known." (1 Corinthians 13:12)

Though I am not at all surprised that there should be those here who are of such liberal hue particularly so determined to dispense entirely with the ancient patrimony of a once treasured Christian heritage within what once was a united Christendom which, then, such elements formally comprised Christian Tradition properly; I can only express certain limited appreciation that there are, at the very least, those few amongst the nihilists who have actually not forgotten so; yet, such an abominably regrettable thing as that utter disregard for such Tradition is no doubt but one of many of the sad symptoms of the times in which we find ourselves today where nihilism itself reigns supreme until only the revisionism that modernity weaves (as facilitated by even their unwitting servants) is the only history.

...to which Aquinas himself fiercely argued the more significant & monumental point that it is the Truth itself that the Church is devoted to and not Aristotle.

The rest, as they say, is history. From that devotion sprung Ockham's razor which opened up the development of modern science and more circuitously, the modern world.

"Before the curse, and everything and everyone became this way. The Golden Age, she thought, when wisdom and justice were the same. Before it all shattered into cutting fragments. Into broken bits that don’t fit, that can’t be put back together, hard as we try." - Philip K. Dick A Scanner Darkly

Actually - the razor, modern science, and the modern world have vanishingly little to do with the concern for truth. In fact, it's pretty much the opposite: Modern science and the modern world are chiefly concerned with pragmatism. The razor's usefulness (abused as it is) breaks down on larger questions of truth, and its application of science mostly serves to keep things simple for reasons of expedience.

Not only that, but the razor - stemming from Occam the nominalist - pretty much arose in contrast to the Thomistic approach to science and truth. Seems odd to bash Thomism by bashing the results of his competitor thinkers.

Mr. Bauman, are you arguing that there is no such thing as a proper ordering of the sciences, including the sciences of philosophy and theology? According to classic understanding, philosophy is the handmaiden science to theology, insofar as philosophy provides many of the tools and pre-requisite concepts that theology makes use of. The fact that the first Kevin above is doing pre-theology by studying philosophy makes all the sense in the world. Calling it "pre-" implies the notion that the study does not end there - it goes on to the more important, the more definitive study: theology.

I purposely did not say "Christian" philosophy, because what I mean is "true" philosophy, wherever those truths are found. If they are found precisely in conjunction with Christian revelation, they are not less validly under the banner "philosophy", except to the extent that they fall under the banner "theology" by that connection to revelation. You seem to be denying that studying the truths of philosophy is a beneficial preparation for theology. Huh?

While it is correct to say that Ockham was a strong critic, his criticism was directed at the epistemological consequences of Aquinas. Aquinas transfers divine necessity into the world through intelligible secondary causes, allowing us to have some comprehension of infinite being through discovery of God’s designs. Scotus insists that God is absolute sovereign and can make or unmake natural law at will, so our understanding of design is necessarily probabilistic. Note that this is not fully at odds with Aquinas; it simply emphasizes the limit of natural reason and improves the status of miracles and revelation. Ockham takes a further step and eliminates divine transference since God is the final cause of everything and all reality is contingent. In Ockham’s view, Aquinas in his attempt to reconcile faith and reason had inadvertently mystified nature and demystified God. Thomas often relied upon metaphor and analogy to show the tenuous relation between human and divine properties. Ockham would have none of it, either God is good in a sense we can understand or not. If not, God was eternally transcendent beyond our intelligence as had traditionally been the stance for orthodox Franciscans.

And orthodox Muslims.

"Scotus insists that God is absolute sovereign and can make or unmake natural law at will, so our understanding of design is necessarily probabilistic."

Where does scotus say that? He does say that the first table (of the 10 commandments which he seems to identify with natural law) is immutable as it looks to the divine nature which is necessary. The second table is indeed contingent, because God has in fact dispensed from it (ordering Abraham to kill Isaac, ordering one of the prophets to marry a harlot). But God is a most-ordered willer, with acts of will always being elicted by and in accordance with reason. But perhaps you're alluding to the potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata distinction, a distinction also found in Aquinas and most other scholastics. FYI, ockham's razor was known as Scotus' rule in the 14th century, though Scotus himself says he got it from Aristotle's II Metaphysics.

Ockham would have none of it, either God is good in a sense we can understand or not.

Aquinas transfers divine necessity into the world through intelligible secondary causes, allowing us to have some comprehension of infinite being through discovery of God’s designs.

First, I think this is a singularly inapt way of putting Aquinas's thought. I don't think "transfers divine necessity into the world through intelligible secondary " is at all cognizant of Thomas' approach. Unless what you mean is just not coming through in those words.

Scotus insists that God is absolute sovereign and can make or unmake natural law at will, so our understanding of design is necessarily probabilistic.

If by absolute, he means God can make natural laws that are inconsistent with each other, or inconsistent with God's love, mercy, justice, etc, then no, Scotus is wrong. If by absolute, he means God could make OTHER natural orders that are different from ours but consistent: this is sufficient to present the knowing that Aquinas derives, and there is no consequence that our knowledge is "probabilistic".

Ockham takes a further step and eliminates divine transference since God is the final cause of everything and all reality is contingent. In Ockham’s view, Aquinas in his attempt to reconcile faith and reason had inadvertently mystified nature and demystified God.

Yes, and insofar as Occam says this, Occam is in error. While this or that part of reality is contingent, it is necessary that IF God creates part A, then He creates a natural order in which there being a created thing A does not contradict God's nature, and which natural order is self-consistent. And God has created A. This is sufficient for analogic knowledge of God. Occam's nominalist philosophy and epistemology does away with all true science altogether, and is totally incompatible with Aquinas. The fact that some modern philosophers borrowed from Occam, and are gravely in error, supports rather than denigrates the Thomistic stance.

If not, God was eternally transcendent beyond our intelligence as had traditionally been the stance for orthodox Franciscans.

And if God is so, then there is no way of ever taking, say, the 5th commandment, and analyzing it to understand how it is possible for the same God to tell Joshua to kill all the Canaanites, who said "Thou shalt not kill." All the apparent contradictions in the Bible are not merely apparent, they can be real and unfathomable for all eternity. And there is no way of ever doing apologetics, or of explaining why we believe as we do (as St. Paul instructs us to do). This view makes all theology an exercise in futility. Indeed, studying the Bible itself (not as theology, but as devotion) would also be an exercise in futility. No wonder the Church embraced the work of St. Thomas.

"Ockham would have none of it, either God is good in a sense we can understand or not. If not, God was eternally transcendent beyond our intelligence as had traditionally been the stance for orthodox Franciscans."

In Eastern Christianity, this dilemma is "resolved" via the essence/energies distinction, which the West doesn't accept. Since nominalism hasn't had a direct impact on Eastern Christian theology, there isn't a whole lot of interaction with it among modern Orthodox theologians and philosophers. Patrick Henry Reardon and (perhaps) David Bentley Hart are exceptions, but both of them are Western converts to Orthodoxy.

Amen to what Zippy says about the "epistemic all-or-nothingism [of] the modern-postmodern false dichotomy." But I have a question that has been bothering me for years. Maybe you all have a theory.

Because no one would go so far as to say that we can fully and perfectly comprehend anything, the epistemic all or nothingists are all really epistemic nothingists. My question is this: how can so many clever epistemic nothingists fail to see that the truth of epistemic nothingism entails the impossibility of knowing that epistemic nothingism is true? I mean, this just seems so obvious. And it isn't difficult, either. My 18 year old son, who has no training in philosophy outside our dinner table conversation, was talking with someone at a university summer program last year who said, "There are no absolutes." He instantly replied, "Is that absolutely true?" If he gets it, why can't all these highly trained thinkers get it? Why isn't nominalism laughed out of the academy, as rendering the academy bootless? I don't understand.

I don't understand how a smart, trained and intellectually honest person can buy nominalism. The nominalists of my acquaintance are a lot smarter than the average bear, and many of them are well-trained. I conclude that they are being intellectually dishonest for reasons so deeply buried that they cannot perceive their dishonesty. A problem with authority, perhaps? Sex? I would be interested in anything you've got.

My question is quite serious, and it may be important. It seems to me that nominalism and relativism are trivially easy to hoist on their own petard, the way my son did. And then - again, if one is honest and careful -the whole modern/post-modern liberal project comes crashing down. Then reality, knowledge, authority and tradition are instantly rehabilitated. So the rescue of the West may possibly be catalyzed by a widespread understanding of nominalism's incoherence.

Great comment, Kristor. Your son is wiser than about 95% of the academy.

I would say that this embrace of logical incoherence lies at the heart of liberalism's self-loathing and death wish. The human psyche will eventual rebel against a philosophy which requires people to clutch at a contradiction awhile pretending it is not.

I am reminded of a Chesterton passage criticizing philosophers who deny free will:

Some Determinists fancy that Christianity invented a dogma like free will for fun —- a mere contradiction. This is absurd. You have the contradiction whatever you are. Determinists tell me, with a degree of truth, that Determinism makes no difference to daily life. That means —- that although the Determinist knows men have no free will, yet he goes on treating them as if they had.

The difference then is very simple. The Christian puts the contradiction into his philosophy. The Determinist puts it into his daily habits. The Christian states as an avowed mystery what the Determinist calls nonsense. The Determinist has the same nonsense for breakfast, dinner, tea, and supper every day of his life.

The Christian, I repeat, puts the mystery into his philosophy. That mystery by its darkness enlightens all things. Once grant him that, and life is life, and bread is bread, and cheese is cheese: he can laugh and fight. The Determinist makes the matter of the will logical and lucid: and in the light of that lucidity all things are darkened, words have no meaning, actions no aim. He has made his philosophy a syllogism and himself a gibbering lunatic.

It is not a question between mysticism and rationality. It is a question between mysticism and madness. For mysticism, and mysticism alone, has kept men sane from the beginning of the world. All the straight roads of logic lead to some Bedlam, to Anarchism or to passive obedience, to treating the universe as a clockwork of matter or else as a delusion of mind. It is only the Mystic, the man who accepts the contradictions, who can laugh and walk easily through the world.

Great line of Chesterton's: "It is not a question between mysticism and rationality. It is a question between mysticism and madness." That paragraph reminds me of something Whitehead said (I paraphrase): Most philosophical error begins with the unwarranted generalization of some truth. Thus with nominalism, it is obviously true that we see through a glass darkly; this does not entail, as the nominalist or Humean skeptic concludes, that we do not see at all.

But this distinction is so very trivial, that I think it must take a specially perverse wickedness to prevent oneself from seeing it. And while I am perfectly willing to accept the idea that there is something demonic at the back of such wickedness, the demonic is generally clothed in the raiment of some worldly good, such as Turkish Delight. It is that worldly good I am trying to understand. What is the hedonic payoff of nominalism? Is it simply the relief of not having to take philosophy seriously? That is to say, do nominalists stick with their position because it relieves them of any moral or even pragmatic obligation to seek the truth? Or because it relieves them of obligation to live thereunto? Relieves them of the burden of their sin?

Maybe I'm answering my own question here. I mean, if there are really no such things as absolute good and evil, then there is really no such thing as a problem, meaning that all one's problems are over, and one may relax.

What is the hedonic payoff of nominalism?

My own opinion is that the "there are no absolutes" relativism is really code for "There are no absolutes except for the ones that we liberals are promoting, such as environmentalism, the recognition of the absolute evil of fundamentalists, and the celebration of homosexuality." Probably some young liberal initiates haven't figured this out yet, but eventually they will. Then they'll just start on their own account using "there are no absolutes" to pull in a few more young liberal initiates. It's still a pretty comfortable doctrine, because as someone said to me lately, even for the Christian liberals among them, "Take up your cross" ends up meaning "have a green campus and recycle," which isn't nearly as annoying as "Don't have sex with your mistress."

Part of the problem with nominalism is that it's so much a part of the air we breathe, being moderns, and since it's omnipresent it's accepted basically uncritically. Unless you're a person who's actually studied it, or studied medieval or ancient philosophy, or at least has read "Ideas Have Consequences," you probably don't even realize there's something else out there.

I'd be hesitant to ascribe malice to most adherents of nominalism, instead putting down a lot of it to sheer ignorance. If Louis Bouyer in 'The Spirit and Forms of Protestantism' could argue that both Luther and Erasmus were unknowingly tainted with it, given its omnipresence in the philosophical and theological schools of their time, how much more true would be that be of scholars today?

Reality is mental. I flipped back over to catch up with this thread and read Rob G.'s comment directly from an email from our church administrator, giving me the text of the Epistle that I am to read this Sunday:

You were dead through the trespasses and sins in which you once lived, following the course of this world, following the ruler of the power of the air, the spirit that is now at work among those who are disobedient. All of us once lived among them in the passions of our flesh, following the desires of flesh and senses, and we were by nature children of wrath, like everyone else. (Ephesians 2:1-10)

Strictly speaking, nominalism does not deny that we can know absolutes. What it does deny is that the universal concepts in the mind exist in reality. Therefore, if you want to refute nominalism, you have to answer this question: How do the universals in the mind exist in reality? How does, say, the concept of "humanity" exist in a world of individual men? Does it exist in reality, or does it exist only as an organizing concept in the mind?

It is a very vexing problem.

It is indeed a very vexing problem. The answer was proposed by Aristotle and refined by Thomas Aquinas. The form which exists really in the substantial reality outside my mind as the form of a concrete being also exists in my mind as the information forming the universal concept, existing in my mind not as forming a substance, but as conforming my thought to the reality.