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No content-neutral perception of ideology

In my recent interview with James Allen on his show, we got to discussing what it means to be an ideologue. I had an inkling from James ahead of time that this question might come up (big revelation), and as I was thinking about it, it occurred to me that many of us are inclined to assume that a charge that someone is an ideologue can be sustained without reference to the truth or falsehood of what he believes. And it occurred to me that this is at most only partly true.

It can be legitimate to argue with a person thus: "Even if your belief about issue X is correct, issue X isn't as important as issue Y, and you are acting as though it is."

But even there, separating his beliefs about issue X from his beliefs about the importance of issue X isn't always as easy as it appears to be.

Suppose, for example, that someone believes that abortion is murder. Given the importance of murder, it's going to be very hard for someone else to say, "Even if your belief about abortion is correct, abortion isn't as important an issue as, e.g., American relations with Russia, more government funding for health care (or whatever); hence, you should compromise on abortion." If abortion is murder, then thousands and thousands of murders are taking place legally in the United States all the time, and it's going to be pretty ludicrous to try to compare that in importance to much of anything else.

What I think we see on the left right now is a hardening of positions on certain subjects, so that they argue not merely that, say, homosexuals should (in some sense of "should") be given the state recognition of marriage for their sexual relationships, but more strongly, that if they aren't, this is a violation of a basic right. Upping the ante, as it were. This requires one to disagree with the position substantively even in order to say, "Oh, come on. Surely we have more important things to worry about."

Moreover, even a position about the relative importance of issues is substantive in one sense. If someone thinks that controlling immigration is incredibly important, you aren't going to be able to tell him he's an ideologue on that subject unless you are also willing to tell him that controlling immigration isn't as important as he thinks it is.

What this second point means is this: There is no way to get a person to back off on a political issue without asking him to change his views about that issue, though those views may be merely implicit and may be metalevel views about the importance of the issue. What makes no sense is to pretend that we can prescind entirely from an evaluation of the truth of what someone believes while at the same time simply, as it were, counting up the units of energy he expends on the issue or measuring his willingness to compromise on the issue and then telling him, "See, look at this. You're an ideologue."

Don't misunderstand me: Rhetorically, it may be that we hope he will, after being presented merely with our incredulity and a picture of himself as he appears to someone else, take a step back, take a deep breath, and get a sense of perspective. Maybe we don't need to expend a lot of argumentative force against the proposition that X issue is incredibly important. It may work rhetorically simply to say something like, "People are dying all over the world, etc., etc., etc., and you are killing yourself over this? Don't you have anything more important to worry about?"

But let's not be in any doubt about what we're doing: We're trying to tell him that he's wrong about something. At a minimum, we're telling him that he's wrong about the importance he ascribes to that issue, and this may well also mean that we're telling him he's just wrong about the issue.

Anyone who decides that he's an ideologue about something and changes his course of action has, ipso facto, changed his mind, even if only implicitly. This is worth bearing in mind for ourselves if we are conservatives: If we change our strategy with regard to some issue, such as abortion, for example, we should ask ourselves if we are changing our minds about it, if we are demoting it in importance. And if so, are we right to do so?

Comments (17)

Anyone who decides that he's an ideologue about something and changes his course of action has, ipso facto, changed his mind, even if only implicitly. This is worth bearing in mind for ourselves if we are conservatives: If we change our strategy with regard to some issue, such as abortion, for example, we should ask ourselves if we are changing our minds about it, if we are demoting it in importance. And if so, are we right to do so?

Conservatives should likewise ask themselves if they really believe abortion is murder if they get extremely squeamish about even tacitly supporting the position of punishing abortion under the murder statutes.

If you find yourself sympathizing with a woman or even a teen girl who is scared and having to make the "tough choice" of killing her child or "womaning up" and accepting responsibility to the point that you would basically let her get away with it, then that says a lot about your views on the subject.

If you find yourself sympathizing with a woman or even a teen girl who is scared and having to make the "tough choice" of killing her child or "womaning up" and accepting responsibility to the point that you would basically let her get away with it, then that says a lot about your views on the subject.

Abortion is murder, make no mistake, but even in a criminal court, during the sentencing phase, there is room for extenuating circumstances. Under Canon Law, a person who procures an abortion incurs an automatic, Latae sententiae excommunication, however, there are certain circumstances which mitigate, such as coercion or mental illness.

The Chicken

Abortion is murder, make no mistake, but even in a criminal court, during the sentencing phase, there is room for extenuating circumstances.

True, but let's not forget that objectively speaking, if abortion is murder, we are talking about issues like:

-A woman choosing to murder her child so she can finish college.
-A woman choosing to murder her child so as to not be disowned.
-A woman choosing to murder her child because she doesn't want to risk her own health (despite a lack of medical evidence to say it is at substantial risk).

I think you would agree that most abortions are done for those reasons or similar ones which do not rise to a level of actual extenuating circumstance.

As I see it, the problem is mainly that conservatives, especially Christians, hold two different expectations for moral behavior: one for men, one for women. Most conservatives who would be squeamish about sentencing a teen girl to life imprison or execution for murder would have no problem giving that penalty to a teen boy who beat his pregnant girlfriend until she miscarried, with that purpose as his motive, despite the fact that both actions carried with them a guilty intent to inflict homicide on the unborn child.

I should have known someone would start saying this stuff, Mike T.

It often seems to me that pro-lifers can't win. The pro-choicers join you, Mike T, in attempting to force on us a "be fiercer or shut up" dichotomy. Others do a similar riff on killing abortionists. "If you really believe abortion is murder, you should condone the acts of those who shoot abortionists."

Then, on the other hand, we have the "moderates" who want us to shut up so they can build their big tent. They were the ones I had in mind in the main post.

No, we won't shut up.

What penalties ought, were we able to write the laws, to fall upon the woman who procures an abortion are matters for prudence. In any event, at the most, she is procuring someone else to kill the child, which removes her from doing the act and makes it easier for her to tell herself lies or accept lies about what is being done. You might be surprised at the number of women who are still told and still bring themselves to believe that the abortion is merely being performed on "a bunch of cells." The abortionist and his staff cleverly intervene to make sure the woman does not get to see her child on an ultrasound, etc. None of this applies in cases where we are talking about the one who actually performs the murder.

Pity for the girl is a lot different from sympathy, in the sense that I think you mean it.

Again, no, we won't shut up.

In any event, I'm far more interested in the actual subject of the main post--whether there is a content-neutral way to understand ideology.

See, Mike T, if you have anything interesting to say about that.

By my understanding, a girl procuring an abortion would be an accessory to murder, since she doesn't carry out the act herself. Even this charge would be politically unpalatable even to the majority that does favor at least some restrictions on abortion. This is probably because of moral confusion, which is expected due to decades long bombardment with 'tough choice' and 'private decision' rhetoric. But for anti-abortion activists to campaign for such distinctions would likely derail the anti-abortion cause and alienate much of its broad appeal, so naturally they avoid the matter.

In any case, the problem remains because abortion is a cultural problem that can't be solved politically with a law here or there. It took centuries of decay for us to start killing our own children, and I expect that a much more radical and momentous event than passage of a law or a supreme court decision (like an utter economic collapse) must happen before the beast is slain for good.

Lydia,

It often seems to me that pro-lifers can't win. The pro-choicers join you, Mike T, in attempting to force on us a "be fiercer or shut up" dichotomy. Others do a similar riff on killing abortionists. "If you really believe abortion is murder, you should condone the acts of those who shoot abortionists."

That is quite different from what I said in this particular case. I merely said that if someone believes that abortion is murder, it logically follows that their views on its proper punishment should line up closely with their views on murder. The fact that many conservatives do no support any meaningful punishment for abortion, even in a hypothetical U.S. where it is able to be fully criminalized, should raise concerns about how much they truly believe abortion is wrong.

I'm not expecting anyone to take up arms or build a gallows, I'm simply pointing out that you can tell a lot about where a person really stands on an issue by what they think should be the result of that issue.

What penalties ought, were we able to write the laws, to fall upon the woman who procures an abortion are matters for prudence. In any event, at the most, she is procuring someone else to kill the child, which removes her from doing the act and makes it easier for her to tell herself lies or accept lies about what is being done.

Assuming that an unborn child is a rights-endowed being fully under the protection of God's moral order, what is the real difference between your scenario here and someone hiring a hitman to take out an enemy? I fail to see how the person's philosophical view of the nature of the target of their violence diminishes the actual severity of what they did. Additionally, on that point, under American law, the principle has always been considered fully accountable for the actions of anyone acting as their agent when the agent is carrying out their instructions.

Matt,

It took centuries of decay for us to start killing our own children, and I expect that a much more radical and momentous event than passage of a law or a supreme court decision (like an utter economic collapse) must happen before the beast is slain for good.

Partly true, but the beast cannot be slain. This is not the first time in which parents murdered their children with society's consent. The West has a sordid history of abortion going back to the pagan Greeks. Modern efficiency simply allowed it to become more rampant.

On the other hand, I think pro-lifers underestimate how quickly abortion would at least fade away if prosecutors could send abortionists to the gallows for capital murder. As a matter of expediency (the ends clearly justify the means here), I would gladly make the exchange of letting the patients go if we could give the death penalty or life imprisonment to the "medical" workers who perform them.

On the other hand, I think pro-lifers underestimate how quickly abortion would at least fade away if prosecutors could send abortionists to the gallows for capital murder.

I agree. In fact, even much lesser punishments like long-term imprisonment would have a big effect. (Unfortunately, many states don't have the death penalty for any murders.)

But on the matter of ideology and content...

This is worth bearing in mind for ourselves if we are conservatives: If we change our strategy with regard to some issue, such as abortion, for example, we should ask ourselves if we are changing our minds about it, if we are demoting it in importance. And if so, are we right to do so?

Changing strategy is changing our way of relating to the other, it does not necessarily mean that we, ourselves, have changed our view. For example, if I try to teach my students about inner product spaces in linear algebra using matricies, it might not work, so I change my strategy and use the triangle relationship. I haven't changed my stance on inner product spaces.

What can happen, and may be a better formulation of what you are looking at is the effects of accommodation on both of the parties. If party A holds view X, but can only convince party Y of view B (which is related, but less than A), does this not mean that X has changed his ideology even as he has changed his content?

My answer is, no, not necessarily. This might be the case and often is when change agents try to use the dialectical persuasion technique to get the other side to change (i.e., so exaggerate the position so as to make a weaker position seem reasonable, even though the change agent really wanted the weaker position to start with), but in some cases, it might be like trying to lead a child to eat his vegetables by first presenting candied yams instead of yams. In the one case, one has changed one's position; in the other no.

The question of ideological change comes down to a matter teleology. If one changes the content, but not the teleology, then the accommodation is temporary. If one changes both the content and the teleology, then one has made a fundamental change in ideology. It may APPEAR to someone on the outside that one has changed their ideology when they have made an accommodation, but ultimately, until one sees where the person intends to go, one cannot say. One may, prudentially, tolerate an evil behavior, for a time, if it is perceived that it will ultimately, at least in possibility, lead to conversion. Had God struck down Saul the moment he collaborated in the killing of Christians, he might never had converted and become St. Paul. This does not mean that one should ORDINARILY accommodate evil. This must be done with prudence. In the matter of abortion, ordinarily, one ought to punish those who conspire to murder. This should be the default position of a rational law. There may be exceptions, where the evil may be tolerated (but it still remains an evil) for other, prudential reasons.

So, Conservatives or anyone else (parents) may, at one time adopt a harsh stance and at another a mild stance regarding some evil behavior without necessarily being contradictory, as long as their teleological outlook does not change and prudence permits the accommodation. Get it wrong and one can foster evil habits; get it right and it can be an act of mercy.

So, while there may be no content-neutral PERCEPTION of ideology, nevertheless, these perceptions may not always correspond to the reality of the situation and a sudden change in perception may not mean that the ideology has actually changed.

What I think we see on the left right now is a hardening of positions on certain subjects, so that they argue not merely that, say, homosexuals should (in some sense of "should") be given the state recognition of marriage for their sexual relationships, but more strongly, that if they aren't, this is a violation of a basic right. Upping the ante, as it were. This requires one to disagree with the position substantively even in order to say, "Oh, come on. Surely we have more important things to worry about."

This is one of the perils of allowing an opponent to change the value scale. In reality, these people have not changed their ideology as their teleology has always been to get blanket acceptance of homosexuality. They have started from a more accommodationist point of view because they knew that their view was so far different from traditional values that their teleology would be outright rejected had they gone to the logical conclusion from the start. The problem is that their teleology is so fundamentally wrong with regards to Christian teleology that accommodation is not possible for the group, as a whole. The mistake many people make is in applying toleration to an individual case means that one can apply toleration to the group. One cannot do this without changing one's own fundamental teleology about what constitutes sin.

Unfortunately, this is happening. If the concept of sin in general is weakened, then how it is applied to a group becomes weakened.

Ultimately, there can be no tolerance for changing the scale of values. Once one makes any step in that direction, without proper cause, one has admitted a change in ideology. This is the goal of many people who try to argue from permission. Tolerance is always time-bound. Changes in ideology can only, really, take place, if they are done independent of time. The homosexual agenda is really an attempt to say that homosexuality should be permitted for all times That is really a way of saying that it is an eternal permission, but that which is permitted for all times is, by definition a good. By trying to make tolerance of homosexuality not bound to a particular place or time, they are trying to make their value of homosexuality as a good a reality.

Since God is outside of time and since he has defined certain things as good or evil for all time, the homosexual agenda is really trying to change the nature of God, for none but he can define these rules. They are, in effect, playing God.

Now, people who give in to the arguments from an ideologue which is opposed to God's laws has, in effect, weakened their own relationship with God. Thus, one reason why the homosexual agenda is able to make headway, today, is because people, in general, have weakened their relationship with God.

Thus, any ideological change is either a move closer to or farther away from God and must strengthen or weaken the relationship with God. I am convinced, that for all of the talk that modern America is a Christian nation, the false ideas of toleration so common today would not have been able to get a foothold if this were truly the case. Relationships with God have deteriorated to the point that all sins are forgiven and no one is held accountable for what he believes.

This is really a discussion about changing relationships with the truth. There are many rhetorical magic tricks that change agents use to do this. Ultimately, our relationship with the truth is our relationship with God and is to be guarded, jealously. What we really lack is in our ideological struggles is a jealousness for the truth. God is jealous for us; ought we not be the same for him?

The Chicken

One type of strategic move I had particularly in mind, MC, was the move of deliberately _not talking_ about our issues, especially during an election. Here's an example: When George W. Bush was running for his first term, there were editorials in National Right to Life News telling voters that they shouldn't worry about the fact that GWB wasn't talking about abortion in his campaign! Not to worry, we were told, this is a strategic move to avoid alienating other voters. It doesn't mean anything.

Now, I'm not going to try to wax hyperbolic here. Bush was well-intentioned. I think that for the most part his heart was in the right place on the life issues. But I could list a number of bad moves he made in that regard, moves that were deliberately downplayed by the right-to-life establishment. And later, when Bush's two terms were finished, the next candidate was John McCain, who was in favor of federal funding for embryonic stem-cell research. This issue was then _dropped_ as a sine qua non for an endorsed candidate, and McCain got the enthusiastic endorsement of NRLC, though previously that issue had been huge for them.

I believe that what happens, psychologically, is that when we make an agreement not to talk about various issues or just to suppress our qualms about a candidate, we subtly influence our own perceptions of the importance of those issues. And the effect is progressive. For one candidate, you decide not to talk about the fact that he supports legal abortion in the case of rape. Then he funds research using tissue from aborted fetuses, and you drop that issue, too, so as not to criticize your guy in the White House. Then along comes somebody even less pro-life, somebody who ditches another one of your issues, and you say, "Oh, well, we'd better not make a big deal about that for strategic reasons," and suddenly the issue is off the radar.

It just isn't what I might call good mental hygiene. We're so afraid of being considered ideologues, making (you've heard it ad nauseum) the perfect the enemy of the good, that we're willing to downplay _important stuff_, thinking that because this doesn't _necessarily_ mean we no longer hold the same positions, it won't mean that *in practice and in the long run*.

How many pro-lifers still really believe that abortion _should_ be illegal in the case of rape? What about politicians designated "pro-life"? How has that change come about?

You see what I mean. What we say and what we don't allow ourselves to say eventually affects the way we think.

What we say and what we don't allow ourselves to say eventually affects the way we think.

I think St. Thomas Aquinas would agree under the auspices of the formation of habits. In the first part of the second part, Q. 53.3 under the question,"How are habits corrupted or diminished," he writes:

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Long. et Brev. Vitae ii) that not only "deception," but also "forgetfulness, is the corruption of science." Moreover he says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "want of intercourse has dissolved many a friendship." In like manner other habits of virtue are diminished or destroyed through cessation from act.

I answer that, As stated in Phys. vii, text. 27, a thing is a cause of movement in two ways. First, directly; and such a thing causes movement by reason of its proper form; thus fire causes heat. Secondly, indirectly; for instance, that which removes an obstacle. It is in this latter way that the destruction or diminution of a habit results through cessation from act, in so far, to wit, as we cease from exercising an act which overcame the causes that destroyed or weakened that habit. For it has been stated (Article [1]) that habits are destroyed or diminished directly through some contrary agency. Consequently all habits that are gradually undermined by contrary agencies which need to be counteracted by acts proceeding from those habits, are diminished or even destroyed altogether by long cessation from act, as is clearly seen in the case both of science and of virtue. For it is evident that a habit of moral virtue makes a man ready to choose the mean in deeds and passions. And when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds, the necessary result is that many passions and deeds fail to observe the mode of virtue, by reason of the inclination of the sensitive appetite and of other external agencies. Wherefore virtue is destroyed or lessened through cessation from act. The same applies to the intellectual habits, which render man ready to judge aright of those things that are pictured by his imagination. Hence when man ceases to make use of his intellectual habits, strange fancies, sometimes in opposition to them, arise in his imagination; so that unless those fancies be, as it were, cut off or kept back by frequent use of his intellectual habits, man becomes less fit to judge aright, and sometimes is even wholly disposed to the contrary, and thus the intellectual habit is diminished or even wholly destroyed by cessation from act.

[My emphasis]

As I said, above, what we say or choose not to say, if governed by prudence, will not affect how we think, since prudence is a virtue connected with correct thinking. It is the incorrect application of prudence which causes some people to hold back when they should speak or to speak when they should hold back. The development of prudence, as with all of the virtues, depends on our growth in our relationship with God. Some people in the public forum are too willing to compromise that relationship for a relationship with men and thus, they damage both their relationship with God and with men. There are, however, times when holding back speech may be an exercise in prudence, as the book of Ecclesiates 3 states.

Talking with someone about the evils of abortion after they have been raped is an exercise of prudence, if the person thinks that abortion after rape is acceptable. Talking about the evils of abortion to someone after they have just miscarried is not prudent and may be cruel.

George W. Bush simply should have talked about abortion. To hold back so as not to alienate people is not a sign of prudence but of trying not to offend. Sometimes, the truth will be offensive and if politicians want an office so much that they have to muzzle themselves on essential issues so as to not offend, then I don't want them in office. This tells me that they think too much about what other people think and not enough about what is right. Many, if not most politicians are like this, today. This is one reason that morality is suffering.

The Chicken

MC, I agree with your points, both that prudence properly understood will govern how far one engages the full truth at certain times, and that GWB should have talked about abortion, and about morality as such, more often. Good points.

Lydia, I am not sure whether you are conflating the difference between an ideologue and a principled thinker, on the one hand, and between the prudent and the imprudent actor on the other.

It is, as far as I can tell, incredibly difficult to distinguish between an ideologue and a principled thinker, without reference to the basic truth of the matter on which they hold forth. You can't do it "neutrally" for the simple reason that principles are not content neutral. Wherever the principles lead, for a particular truth, the person who holds the opposite stance (and holds it as firmly as one ought to hold true principles) would almost have to be an ideologue , wouldn't they? But that refers to someone who is wrong in principle.

But two good men can rightly hold the truth from a principled stand and disagree on tactics, precisely because the requirements for getting ALL of the tactics right means knowing more detailed facts than any one man, or even any small group of men, could expect to have. The fact that two such men disagree should not imply that one of them has a tenuous hold on his principles. There are, after all, situations where it is simply not possible to be sure which is the best of several poor options, without knowledge of the future (rather, of several possible futures).

I grant that we have seen a steady decline in the sensibility for solid morals as "conservatives" have _given up_ on certain standards. Abortion is one of the obvious places for that, along with divorce and sexual immorality. It is rather difficult, though, to establish that this decline is _more_ due to people who had been holding the truth but doing so ineffectively and imprudently, versus it being due to people who willingly gave up holding the truth because they no longer wanted to work at being moral themselves.

It is rather difficult, though, to establish that this decline is _more_ due to people who had been holding the truth but doing so ineffectively and imprudently, versus it being due to people who willingly gave up holding the truth because they no longer wanted to work at being moral themselves.

I'd say on divorce and sexual immorality, probably the latter. On abortion, to a greater extent than the others, more the former, because I don't think most pro-lifers are hoping for loopholes so they can have abortions. I've been watching the pro-life movement rather carefully for some while with regard to these very questions, and I've seen more than once that moral confusion has followed tactical quiescence. Post hoc isn't propter hoc, but listening to people talk and reading what they write, together with just some empirical reasoning, have given me reason to believe that there is a causal connection. Consider, for example, the fact that the issue of fetal tissue research dropped out of discussion in NRL News _just at the time_ GWB was elected, that shortly thereafter his NIH funded research using aborted fetal tissue, and that Douglas Johnson _expressly_ defended their decision not to make a big deal about it because they had bigger things to worry about--namely, embryonic stem-cell research. Consider the fact that ESCR then was the big deal for the next eight years, until last November, when it suddenly disappeared from the political comparison charts between John McCain and Barack Obama. One didn't need to be a rocket scientist to figure out that this was because the two candidates held nearly identical positions on the subject.

I say that it is dangerous to a moral understanding of the importance of the ESCR issue to leave it off of a chart comparing presidential candidates on "the issues" when that chart is prepared by the nation's leading right to life group.

Here's another one: We started with the defensible position that a candidate could legitimately vote for a law that included exceptions for rape, incest, and the life of the mother if that were viewed as an incremental step toward full protection and if it were an improvement on the present situation. Fine. I'm not as much of a purist as I probably sound like. _However_, we moved from there to outright endorsement of candidates who said that *they believe abortion should be legal in the case of the three exceptions*. Bush even believed it should be _funded_ in those cases. Now, this is a very different thing from a candidate who says he'd vote, as an incremental step, for a law that improved the situation that had those three exceptions. But voters were chided by NRLC for being unhappy about Bush's position on abortion in the case of rape. You see how it goes? Suddenly, that exception is enshrined as an _acceptable_ exception, not merely as a strategic thing permitted in an incremental law. And we'll never move back on that one.

Something has been lost, morally.

So, yes, I think in some cases one can tell when imprudence in strategy has led to moral confusion or is likely to do so.

Will it ever again be a sine qua non for a presidential candidate in order for him to be endorsed by mainstream pro-life groups that he opposes federal funding for ESCR?

Lydia, all of what you say about the candidates may be true. However, there is the other side of the equation: to what extent would putting an Algore or a John Kerry instead of GWB have made the current situation _even worse_ than it is right now. Or, (to make sure we ask the right question) to what extent is it probable that the solidly pro-life sector (whatever #s you want to assign to that, say 15%?) voting for someone other than GWB would have resulted in a better outcome? There is the distinct possibility that the results would have included the following: (1) Algore or John Kerry would have the White House, and have implemented the pro-death mentality all the sooner in those areas the federal government controls and influences; (2) the next election would have seen an uprising of conservative pro-life candidates, since (it will have been argued) no Republican could win without being pro-life; (3) such candidates lose because they lose the vote of "moderates" and social free-thinker Republicans who actually want abortion available; (4) the Democruds establish a lock on high office.

No, I don't think these are the only reasonable outcomes. What I would suggest, rather, is that the realm of possible long-range outcomes versus the range of practical choices before a man principled and attempting prudence is too wide for clear forecasting. If the long-range results are too difficult to forecast, then the immediate and short term results become the primary guiding force for prudential choice.

Is it too naive to say that a good man or woman would publicly make their case for their vote for a GWB in toleration of his obvious and explicitly denounced defects, and commit to God the results in the minds of other men, whether for some of those men such mere toleration ends up giving them an excuse to shift their minds towards a flawed respect for life and a willingness to countenance murder in the "difficult" cases? Isn't it the case that Jesus was also "misunderstood" by those who really didn't want to hear the message? The fact that some (even most) others reject the forthright meaning of bare toleration, instead taking it as full-fledged total support, must be at least partly laid on those who so willingly misunderstand, isn't it?

Tony, the pro-life groups did not merely tolerate these positions. There was no misunderstanding. They gave full-fledged, total support. In fact, it was inevitable that they should do so in their published materials, once they decided to give the endorsement. No doubt they would have said that it is impractical to say outright, "He's definitely wrong on such-and-such, but we should vote for him anyway," and to say that repeatedly and perhaps even with understanding for those unwilling to make that particular prudential compromise. No. Sarah Palin went on Focus on the Family and said something like, "John McCain is with us on the issues." ESCR had simply fallen off the map. We were all told that he was just pro-life, pro-life, this was wonderful.

It would be possible to give the kind of measured support you are talking about as an individual, but that's not how political campaigns work. And there's no misunderstanding the "Go, So-and-So," "So-and-So is our guy!" "Hurray for So-and-so!" "So-and-so is pro-life!!!" rhetoric. It says what it says. Qualification would water down its political effectiveness, even if qualification is seriously warranted on serious issues.

I don't need to run a group that gives endorsements to understand this dilemma. If you don't endorse the better candidate his rival may win. And if you do endorse him, you have to _endorse_ him. You can't go around solemnly telling people so that there is no misunderstanding that you are merely tolerating his positions on X and Y _very serious and important issues_. But if you don't do that, then inevitably, X and Y come to seem like much less serious issues. And those who keep talking about them are cast as and made to look like ideologues.

Yeah, I was a bit taken aback by the NRLC and how it played endorsement in the last election. You're right that once endorsement is granted, an organization doesn't seem interested in qualifiers. Maybe that means that such organizations shouldn't be involved in endorsements at all.

I was reading St. Augustine's City of God this morning, and came across this little passage as a quote from Cicero:

"...so, where reason is allowed to modulate the diverse elements of the state, there is obtained a perfect concord from the upper, lower, and middle classes as from various sounds, and what musicians call harmony in singing, is concord in matters of state, which is the strictest bond and best security of any republic, and which by no ingenuity can be retained where justice has become extinct."

I have been saying for years that many of the other ills of our society will be more easily addressed if we can see our way clear to basic justice for the unborn. I don't always see a direct connection between certain social or political problems and legal abortion, but I think that the moral threads exist which connect them, and these moral threads have been strained to the breaking point - the breaking point of our very society, that is.

I have been saying for years that many of the other ills of our society will be more easily addressed if we can see our way clear to basic justice for the unborn.

That includes banning artificial contraception, as well. People have lsot a sense of sin. Restore that and many problems in society will correct themselves.

The Chicken

That includes banning artificial contraception, as well.

I would go along with that. (In any case, the many of the most common contraceptives are themselves abortifacients, so stopping all abortions would mean stopping these contraceptives.) Unfortunately, I cannot imagine a realistic scenario under which our society chose to get rid of the damned things.

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