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William Lane Craig on divine simplicity

In answer to a reader’s request, I respond to Craig’s critique of this central doctrine of classical theism, over at my personal blog.

Comments (30)

I'll admit I still don't understand how the Trinity is supposed to fit in with divine simplicity.

Maybe that's because 'divine simplicity' is not a synonym for 'uncomplicated', or 'completely comprehensible'.

Some Orthodox writers have made a distinction between divine simplicity, which they would accept, and absolute divine simplicity, which they reject as pagan and non-Biblical. The latter, they argue, ultimately results in God as a sort of monad, since it makes all His "attributes" exactly equal to each other: his love equals his justice, and his justice equals his will, therefore his love equals his will -- that sort of thing.

A book (which I've not read) that analyzes this question in terms of the differences in philosophy/theology between Eastern and Western Christianity is Aristotle East and West by David Bradshaw, who teaches philosophy at the Univ. of Kentucky. He and David Bentley Hart apparently had a spirited exchange on this subject a couple years ago at a conference on Augustine at Fordham.

Similarly, God’s knowledge of things is not a matter of coming to know them. Rather, He knows all things by virtue of knowing Himself as timelessly creating them.

Since I'm inclined to a rather Boethian view of Divine foreknowledge, I was with you here, Ed, all the way up to the last two words. I don't see that God's timeless knowledge need have anything to do with His eternally creating things. Would it not also apply to God's knowledge of contingent truths about human actions, which in a very important sense (given human freedom and real agency) He doesn't create?

Maybe that's because 'divine simplicity' is not a synonym for 'uncomplicated', or 'completely comprehensible'.

Okay. What is the meaning in 'divine' that modifies 'simplicity' into something complicated and partially incomprehensible?

Will 'infinite' do it for you?

Despite a Bible college undergrad degree with lots of Baptist theology, I had never seen a full definition of Divine simplicity until reading Ed's post (the full one at his own blog). Which I guess goes to show that Divine simplicity is not important to even theology-geek Baptists. An immediate question, which I'm sure has been much discussed, does occur to me: If Divine simplicity means that God's attributes are all one, so that God's omnipotence really is God's omnibenevolence, would that not make it metaphysically impossible for the Second Person of the Godhead to "empty himself" of some of those attributes (e.g., omnipresence) but not of others (e.g., sinlessness) in the Incarnation?

Craig's non-recognition of the analogy of being is definately the source of his error. Nice insight, Ed.

Seems like a pretty good question to ask Lydia. I'm sure Ed has read it and was unconvinced but have you read Plantinga's 'Does God have a Nature'?

If Divine simplicity means that God's attributes are all one, so that God's omnipotence really is God's omnibenevolence, would that not make it metaphysically impossible for the Second Person of the Godhead to "empty himself" of some of those attributes (e.g., omnipresence) but not of others (e.g., sinlessness) in the Incarnation?

This sentence doesn't make sense to me, since Divine simplicity does not mean that God has attributes. He has an attribute, which may express itself differently as different things when it comes in contact with relationships separate from himself. If God were the only thing in existence, then it would be more apparent that there is only one attribute, since his justice and his mercy would be the same thing, his omniscience and his omibenevolence would also be the same. It is not God who has attributes, it is our interaction with him that creates attributes FOR US.

That being said, The idea that Jesus emptied himself, means that he agreed to a dual nature, something the other members of the Trinity do not have. He emptied himself in that part of him was no longer in the fullness of the exclusive relationship of the Trinity, but was emptied so that he might have a relationship with men.

The Chicken

Sigh, try again, with proper blockquotes:

Lydia wrote:

If Divine simplicity means that God's attributes are all one, so that God's omnipotence really is God's omnibenevolence, would that not make it metaphysically impossible for the Second Person of the Godhead to "empty himself" of some of those attributes (e.g., omnipresence) but not of others (e.g., sinlessness) in the Incarnation?

This sentence doesn't make sense to me, since Divine simplicity does not mean that God has attributes. He has an attribute, which may express itself differently as different things when it comes in contact with relationships separate from himself. If God were the only thing in existence, then it would be more apparent that there is only one attribute, since his justice and his mercy would be the same thing, his omniscience and his omibenevolence would also be the same. It is not God who has attributes, it is our interaction with him that creates attributes FOR US.

That being said, The idea that Jesus emptied himself, means that he agreed to a dual nature, something the other members of the Trinity do not have. He emptied himself in that part of him was no longer in the fullness of the exclusive relationship of the Trinity, but was emptied so that he might have a relationship with men.

>

Well, okay, MC, but the idea that God's existence is the same thing as His attributes so that he doesn't really "have" attributes just adds another layer of complexity. I was simply referring to the part of Ed's explanation in which he said that God's ____ is God's _________, filling in the blanks with traditional attributes of God. The question about the incarnation doesn't really seem to turn on the business about attributes and existence. What it turns on is the idea that there is really only one Divine attribute. If this is true, then it seems impossible to separate omnipresence from omnibenevolence. Literally impossible. The analogy to the morning star/evening star only makes this clearer. To say that Jesus was all-good because He was God but was not omnipresent would seem, on that account, to be like saying, "The morning star was visible in the sky today, but the evening star definitely wasn't there."

Hi William,

I don't think Step2's is a silly question. I think relating the doctrine of the Trinity to the doctrine of divine simplicity was a big worry for medieval philosophers who accepted the two (Wolterstorff has a paper on this called "Can Theology Recover from Kant?", I think).

According to the doctrine of the Trinity, God is the Father, God is the Son, and God is the Holy Spirit, but the Father is not the Son, the Father is not the Holy Spirit, and the Son is not the Holy Spirit. If God has only one attribute, though, then how can the Father not be Identical with the Son? It will do no good to say God is the Father insofar as He relates to His creatures in one way, and He's the Son insofar as He relates to his creatures in another way, because that would be the fallacy of modalism. So it is a bit tricky, and not to be dismissed with one-liners.

Indeed, I see Ed has a response to Step2's question over on his blog!

http://edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/06/trinity-sunday.html

I think Lydia's comment is well worth a clarifying answer. Let me see if I can do anything to make sense out of it.

First of all, remember that when we say God has an attribute (or all the Divine attributes), this is itself already a sort of muddied way of speaking. He Himself is not distinct from His "attributes" at all, unlike how we are. He is the one thing whose "to be" expresses the fullness of all perfection whole and entire.

Secondly, I really don't think that MC's explanation of the Second Person emptying Himself is compatible with a discussion of the Divine nature rooted in His being and essence as one and the same. For, while the Second Person is a Person who is in union with a human nature, He does not cease to be Divine in any sense. MC's phrasing

He emptied himself in that part of him was no longer in the fullness of the exclusive relationship of the Trinity, but was emptied so that he might have a relationship with men.

is literally impossible to a Divine Person, I think. Since God's being is one and necessary, and this applies equally to all three Persons, nothing about the internal "exclusive relationship of the Trinity" can be modified by an action of one Person. The Father's knowledge of Himself eternally is the Logos, (who also became man). The Logos could no more empty Himself of that relationship than that God could cease to know himself.

By the way, Jesus is not all-good in respect of His human nature, He is so only in respect of His Divine nature. In His human nature He is wholly good, but only wholly good as human nature can be good, not as Divine nature can be.

The real problem lies in asking how one Person can assume human nature at all, in any sense, without the other Persons doing so. In God "Person" and "Nature" are not really distinct, yet they have distinct meanings, inasmuch as person signifies after the manner of something subsisting. And because the human nature is united to the Word, so that the Word subsists in it, and not so that His Nature receives therefrom any addition or change, is follows that the union of human nature to the Word of God took place in the Person and not in the Nature. (St. Thomas, Part 3, Q 2, A 2)

But more directly: The operation of assuming refers to the Divine Nature, and so is common to all three Persons. But the term of the operation is a Person, and this is distinct to the Word. (Q 3, A 4).

Bobcat, you are quite right in saying that it would be an error to say that God is Father in respect of one way of relating to creatures, and He is the Son insofar as He relates to creatures in another way. This would mean that God would NOT be Trinitarian from all eternity, but only by reason of created being. Which is clearly not what Christians hold.

According to the Thomistic way of explaining it, God's knowing of Himself is so fundamentally total that his Logos which is the "known" is perfectly the image of the knower: The intelligible emanation in the act of knowing is the procession of generation, because the one known is absolutely like in kind to the knower, and this is what generation does - produces another who is of the same nature. And in this procession, there are two relations, that knower and known, which are subsistent, and are thus distinct Persons.

And the relations in the operation of loving, the lover and loved in God springing forth out of the knowing are also subsistent, so that the lover is subsistent as is the beloved. The beloved is Himself another Person distinct from lover (either the Father or Son), but the lover is NOT distinct from either the Father or the Son, since the only thing that distinguishes the Father from the Son is the relational difference in generation, and not in loving. So the Holy Spirit proceeds BOTH from the Father and the Son.

These relations in God are of course eternal.

So it is a bit tricky, and not to be dismissed with one-liners.

Well, the trickiness was not explicit in his question. It seemed a narrow one so I answered in kind. I would never dismiss Step2. On occasion he shows promise.

If God has only one attribute, though, then how can the Father not be Identical with the Son?

You must be using 'attribute' in a way with which I'm unfamiliar. I think of God's attributes as His omnipotence, omniscience, goodness, etc., united in a simplicity of being; that is, in His indivisibility. Which I think is Step2's real difficulty: getting from indivisibility to a trinity of persons, and which I doubt one can accomplish without benefit of Revelation. But even without it, the divine simplicity need not be the enemy of its infinite beauty, and that was my only point.

Dear Tony,

You wrote:

The Logos could no more empty Himself of that relationship than that God could cease to know himself.

True and that is what I meant, in part, so I must have expressed myself badly. Jesus did not empty himself from the relationship with the Father. To do so is impossible, but the Father and the Holy Spirit have the same relationship to man since they are the Godhead, but Jesus has a specific relationship, in his humanity, that the Father and the Spirit do not have. By adding this relationship, in this relationship to man Jesus is emptied of the exclusive divine relationship that Jesus would have had if he were only God. he still retains that relationship in his Divinity, but not in his humanity. That part is emptied of the Divine relationship, directly. It still maintains the relationship perichoretically.

Does this clarify things? I did not mean that Jesus changed his relationship to the Father, but that he added a relationship to man that was different than that with his Father and so that part of his nature was emptied.

Feel free to correct.

The Chicken

Bobcat,
Thanks.

William,
I am afraid this will be one of those occasions I don't show much promise. Infinity as a mathematical concept is formulaic (yet it is paradoxically represented as if it were finite), but since God has no form God could not be infinite in the simple sense of ‘infinite’. If you intend to use infinite in a more complicated sense the language should reflect that instead of using the word simplicity. I also consider complexity to be strikingly beautiful from an aesthetic viewpoint if that was your intent.

However, you are right that it is the indivisibility that is the major stumbling block. A coherent view of the Trinity can be maintained if you hold them as interconnected elements of the Godhead, but to insist they are distinct from each other while also claiming the whole is fundamentally indivisible is to lose sight of the trees for the forest.

A coherent view of the Trinity can be maintained if you hold them as interconnected elements of the Godhead...

Wouldn't this mean "as one person?" I'm not sure what the word "elements" means.

I did not mean that Jesus changed his relationship to the Father, but that he added a relationship to man that was different than that with his Father and so that part of his nature was emptied.

But the Persons in God all share the exact same nature - the nature of God is one.

I have never really sorted out what precisely is meant by "emptied out" in this context, but I would have thought that it refers more to an aspect in relation to US, not to the other Persons: As God, Jesus is due our utmost worship, adoration, praise, and honor. In becoming man, and at that a poor baby of no circumstance, He gave up coming to us under the appearance in which we would in fact give Him that worship, adoration, etc.

but to insist they are distinct from each other while also claiming the whole is fundamentally indivisible is to lose sight of the trees for the forest.

Like William, am would be worried about using "elements" in reference to God. Except perhaps in an explicitly derivative and attenuated sense, kind of like "that which we reference as "attribute" but is in God not an attribute properly but something more.

When we say that God is indivisible, we don't mean that the Persons are indistinguishable. They are certainly distinguishable. But we don't mean they are distinguishable by having reference to different "parts" of God, since they are all equally God, in exactly the same sense.

Wouldn't this mean "as one person?" I'm not sure what the word "elements" means.

It means that 'person' could be abstractly applied to a group with shared purpose, much like our legal system recognizes personhood rights in corporations.

When we say that God is indivisible, we don't mean that the Persons are indistinguishable. They are certainly distinguishable. But we don't mean they are distinguishable by having reference to different "parts" of God, since they are all equally God, in exactly the same sense.

If they are distinguishable they cannot be identical. To say they are equally God in exactly the same sense is to say they are identical.

If they are distinguishable they cannot be identical.

This doesn't seem right. (But I'm not a logician, a philosopher, or theologian so...) But can't two things be distinguishable yet united in one identity? I know that the person Step2 is possessed of at least two indispensable qualities, intellect and will. They are distinguishable, yet inhere in the identity of one person, without which qualities that person could not properly be said to possess a human nature. By analogy, why couldn't 3 distinguishable persons inhere in the identity of one God?

They are distinguishable, yet inhere in the identity of one person, without which qualities that person could not properly be said to possess a human nature.

They are distinguishable, and my thoughts and behavior can also be referenced by those different qualities of my human nature. If they were identical there would be no ability to describe areas of union and conflict between my intellect and will.

The problem you're having, Step2, is that you're trying to cut down the tree by gnawing on the twigs.

If they were identical there would be no ability to describe areas of union and conflict between my intellect and will.

I think we're using "identity" and "identical" in different ways. I didn't say they were identical, but distinguishable as characteristics of a single identity. There is only one area of union (or conflict) between them and that is in the identity of the person Step2.

(I'm tired. Maybe will try again tomorrow.)

Tony: But we don't mean they are distinguishable by having reference to different "parts" of God, since they are all equally God, in exactly the same sense.

Me: If they are distinguishable they cannot be identical.

William: I didn't say they were identical, but distinguishable as characteristics of a single identity.

Therefore, as characteristics of a single identity they can be accurately referenced as different parts of my identity.

Yes, as the three persons can be accurately referenced as different parts of one Divine nature. By analogy of course. I've already conceded that I don't think one can get to that conclusion by logic alone. The original dispute concerned whether the simplicity of that one nature was confounded by the complexity of its manifestation, which I don't see how it could be, any more than I would suppose that the simplicity of Step2's human nature were somehow compromised by the complexity of his personality.

Even if by reason I arrived only at the One, I would expect to see once I got there a being of endless (since you don't like 'infinite') beauty, utterly unrestricted in its capacity to reveal itself, yet absolutely simple in its integrity of substance.

An interesting corollary to all this (interesting to me, anyway) has always been the question: if we can reason to the One, can reason also lead us to conclude that its essence is love?

The original dispute concerned whether the simplicity of that one nature was confounded by the complexity of its manifestation, ...
Fractals, anyone?

Here's my two cents.

Protestants have a unique problem with the doctrine of divine simplicity. Given the adherence to Sola Scriptura, it requires an exegetical demonstration prior to coming up with a coherent philosophical gloss of the concept. Sure there are passages that speak of divine unity, but unity can be said in many ways, and its far from clear that one can exegetically eek out Augustine's concept from those texts.

On the philosophical front, analogical predication be used to defend te Augustinian notion of divine simplicity, since it is a consequence of it.

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