What’s Wrong with the World

DO you consider class as much of a factor as race in terms of genotype?

Non-human animals have a psychology?

Ever been around a beaten dog, Ilion?

Ever beaten a dog, Ilion?

One of the purely physical causes that can have profound effects on one's psychology &/or behavior is one's genotype

That's profound.

Yes, my genotype makes me a male human being. Sometimes I even engage in human male types of behavior, all the while reveling in my human male genotype. So what? Why don't you write a post that cuts to the chase?

Sigh. I knew it. No, Steve, you're not going to get us to accept some sort of genetic determinism just by using a phrase in "first premise" and "second premise" like "profound effects on one's behavior." Oh, by the way: It's far from obvious that pigeons have free will. With humans, it's supposed to be kinda sorta important.

Hmm, okay, Steve, I just saw your comment in response to me in the previous thread, as well as your response about "subtext" to Untenured.

I think the problem people have with sociobiology is going to come at later points in the argument, then. As in--it seems exceedingly implausible that many really interesting human behaviors really are in any interesting and specific sense the result of genotype and present in the human race now because the genotype that encourages them or partially causes them or whatever phrase one wants to use was selected for in the past. Genius (and other interesting human manifestations) are not that easily explained. (This reminds me of a wondrous rant my husband read to me last night by Arthur Quiller-Couch on German literary critics and their literary "history" that involves attributing the productions of Wordsworth, Keats, and every other great artist to "tendencies" and "the great artist, History.")

I don't know what conclusion Steve is trying to argue for, but I have a hunch as to why he's going about it so slowly.

It's a kind of psychological test, I think. The idea is, if he tells you each premise, one by one, without revealing the conclusion, you're all going to give more honest reactions to each of the premises than if he just laid the entire argument out for you.

This reminds me of the time when I tried out Alex Pruss's new cosmological argument out on some atheist friends of mine in grad school. While they rejected the principle, "for every contingent state of affairs S, there is an explanation for why S holds" (the PSR), they accepted the premise, "possibly, for any contingent state of affairs S, there is an explanation for why S holds" (a weaker PSR). Once they realized that this forced them to the conclusion that there is a necessarily existent being, they went back and rejected the weaker PSR. To me, that looked like bad faith, though in retrospect, I'm not sure that it was.

Bobcat -
This is a classic setup. I can't remember which great philosopher did it, but it's older than dirt....

That said, in the case of your argument, you probably felt cheated because of the difference of worldview. Generally what it boils down to-- both sides admit X is possible, and find it more or less likely depending on the situation. Part of why I'm very picky about semantics, since that tends to head off that situation and save everyone's time. (Sometimes exposes issues on folks' thinking, too.)

An example is the "people have no free will, it's an illusion" argument-- drugs alter our perception, damage alters our perception, we can't measure the soul, therefore it's all in our heads. The packed-in assumptions are what get you, that and that just because something is sometimes true, it's not always true.

To me, that looked like bad faith, though in retrospect, I'm not sure that it was.

I don't know about whether it was bad faith in that case, Bobcat, but very often it's a matter of the meaning of terms. It's sometimes only when someone tells you, "Conclusion X follows from premises you've accepted" that you realize that you accepted the premise using some term in a different sense from the sense in which he's using it to get conclusion X.

If premise 2 is really a premise, then premise 1 is redundant, since 1 is implied by 2. So in reality we're still at premise 1.

This could take a while, people.

Steve, why don't you just come out with the whole syllogism so we can blow it out of the water and be done with it.

I agree with Lydia on the sociobiology premises. Look again at the Zeroth Premise, as formulated by Steve Burton in a comment to his previous post:

[A]nti-Darwinists have a problem with the fundamental presuppositions of "evolutionary psychology."

I doubt that premise, the premise underlying this whole exercise. I don't think any serious critic denies the fundamental presuppositions of evolutionary psychology. Remember, even such critics as Richard Lewontin and Stephen Jay Gould emphasized that they supported sociobiology in principle and that it was undeniable that human behavior evolved partly as a result of natural selection. They objected to bad sociobiology, which they considered to include all sociobiology being done at the time.

I don't think even the most extreme anti-Darwinists seriously deny the existence of natural selection, though they may argue about the correct formulation of the theory. I don't think anyone's seriously denying that humans have changed over time in part through natural selection, even if we're all literally descended from Adam and Eve. As Lydia said, serious critics of evolutionary psychology are pretty far along in the chain of premises.

Correction: I meant that Lewontin and Gould considered all human sociobiology at the time to be bad science.

Example of how uncontroversial genetic influence is on psychology, as long as one doesn't take "influence" to be deterministic: I'm adopted. I've always had a terrible temper. In my thirties, I made contact (with her permission) with my biological mother and learned some things about her and about who my biological father was. When I did further research and learned more about him, I learned that he had a terrible temper--I mean, a _really_ terrible temper. I considered this enlightening and a partial explanation of my own personality. Which is not to say that I have an excuse for fire-blasting everyone in the immediate vicinity (electronically or physically) when I'm in a bad mood.

Lydia wrote

I don't know about whether it was bad faith in that case, Bobcat, but very often it's a matter of the meaning of terms. It's sometimes only when someone tells you, "Conclusion X follows from premises you've accepted" that you realize that you accepted the premise using some term in a different sense from the sense in which he's using it to get conclusion X.

but when I saw what conclusions it led to, namely the almost complete destruction of a distinction between charity and moral obligation, I became less sure of it.

Maybe the distinction between charity and moral obligation, or the specialness of the duty to one particular set of people, or several other candidates, which would have to be given up if one accepted Singer's argument and prescriptions, is something "of greater moral significance" than the badness of famine. :-)

WL - you are quite right to speak ironically. This is not a "profound" point. It's a bloody obvious point.

"Why don't you write a post that cuts to the chase?"

Because I've been around that block again and again, and have nothing to show for it.

I've decided to try the step-by-step approach, instead.

Lydia @ 10:05 a.m. - yes, you pretty much totally missed the boat, here. Thanks for noticing.

I think we might disagree about what human behaviors count as "really interesting."

I wonder what you think of the so-called "big five" personality traits...interesting, or not interesting?

Possibly influenced by genetic factors, or definitely not?

Bobcat - you're a much cleverer fellow than I am.

George R. - glad to see you following the discussion with your usual open mind ;^)

Hi Steve,

Maybe I'm too clever by half, then?

At any rate, looking more closely at your post:

One of the purely physical causes that can have profound effects on one's psychology &/or behavior is one's genotype.

Please note that, when it comes to cats, dogs, pigs, pigeons, and all other non-human animals, nobody even pretends seriously to dispute this point.

I'm actually not sure I accept this. I mean, I agree there are clear cases where one's genotype has profound effects on one's psychology/behavior: e.g., Down's syndrome. And of course, your genes need to meet certain criteria for you to be able to reach normal human functioning. However, if you think that genes are mostly responsible for a wide range of complex human behaviors/phenomena, like why black people have lower IQs than white people, or why there are fewer women in math and science than men, I think this isn't obvious. I mean, I'm not ruling it out that genetic factors could explain these things, but I wouldn't be at all shocked if they didn't have much to do with them, either.

Of course, when it comes to genetics, I know very, very little. But after tooling around a bit on the subject of race and IQ -- looking at Arthur Jensen, Steve Sailor, Cosma Shalizi, and Robert Nisbett, it seems like the jury is very far from in.

Aaron: Lewontin & Gould were no more "serious critics" of evolutionary psychology than are dilettantes like Auster. Intellectually dishonest hacks, the both of them, made hopelessly stupid by their ideological preconceptions.

I am very, very surprised to find you citing them as authorities. You might as well quote Trofim Lysenko.

Steve, I was unfamiliar with the "big five personality traits" until you brought them up. Have now only consulted La Wik on them.

It looks to me as though, like many areas of temperament, they are likely to be influenced by both nature and nurture (see my comment above about having a terrible temper). Are they interesting? Sure, they are, to some extent. But they aren't complex human behavior. They are temperament types or broadscale aspects of personality. An important part of my quarrel with sociobiology is the attempt to move from general personality traits to complex human behavior. It's not that I'm anti-heredity. In fact, I take heredity fairly seriously. But to say that various important human complex behaviors ranging from kindness to animals to writing poetry to worshiping God to betting on the stock market are "explained" by Darwinian mechanisms in the dim and misty past history of the race has seemed to me again and again to be silly and to have the marks of pseudo-science.

Bobcat - you "agree there are clear cases where one's genotype has profound effects on one's psychology/behavior," but you're not "sure" that you "accept" that "one of the purely physical causes that can have profound effects on one's psychology &/or behavior is one's genotype?"

Well...ummm...

I had never heard of the "big 5 personality traits". They seem to be a bit over-broad to do any real work, because it would be virtually impossible to define them rigorously. And I seriously doubt that "neuroticism" is an intelligible basic "trait" at all, not in those terms. To the extent that the trait is getting at anything, it either IS some other reality, or is a mix of other traits more basic. I would almost certainly disagree with La Wik's comment

The Big Five model is a comprehensive, empirical, data-driven research finding.

It cannot be "comprehensive" formally unless it is impossible for a human trait to be distinct from these or an admixture of these, and there is no way to prove that. And the article even says that they "contain and subsume MOST" traits, not all.

In any case, Steve, your 2 premises are pretty close to simple and clean, except that I am not sure that it is easy to call the genotype a "purely physical" cause.

It sure is the case that the genotype is an important influence on the personality and psychology, and therefore on behavior. I cannot imagine anyone who accepts the reality of genes as disagreeing with that. Another important influence is the chemical (especially, hormonal) bath in which the genes start to switch on, because that ALSO influences a lot of what the genotype actually expresses. And emotions (a not-entirely-physical reality) influence the hormones present as the child develops, so the emotions influence the expression of the genotype growing into the adult person. And the thoughts that you think have a significant influence on the emotions, and therefore the thoughts have a significant influence on what influence the genotype has on psychology and behavior. (This helps explain why identical twins don't have identical personalities.)

Or, as the ancients had it: a healthy person requires a healthy body and a healthy mind, for the mind affects the body and the body affects the mind. A person's psychological illness can be the root cause of illness expressed in physical problems, from a bad back to spleen malfunction.

Possibly influenced by genetic factors, or definitely not?

I have always assumed that personality traits (however organized to assist in thinking about them) are strongly influenced by genes. In watching kids develop, it is incredibly easy to see personality elements of the parents visible in the children. In all sorts of weird mixtures.

Let's get on with the 3rd, 4th, and 5th points, if you intend to get anywhere.

For example, when I first heard Singer's famine relief argument, I believed the assumption, "if you can stop something morally significantly bad from happening without having to give up anything of equal or greater moral significance, then you should do so", but when I saw what conclusions it led to, namely the almost complete destruction of a distinction between charity and moral obligation, I became less sure of it.

I'd guess that he falls into the over-simplifying camp--as you might've guessed from him qualifying it to moral significance. For starters, have to look at the effects of you taking action, and on them, and all the nice little ripples that go out from there. (famously shown by the "give a man a fish" story)

Bobcat - you "agree there are clear cases where one's genotype has profound effects on one's psychology/behavior," but you're not "sure" that you "accept" that "one of the purely physical causes that can have profound effects on one's psychology &/or behavior is one's genotype?"

Well...ummm...

No, I accept that one's genotype can have profound effects on one's psychology and/or behavior; what I'm significantly less sure of is what behavior one can explain well by pointing to one's genotype.

I see why you wrote what you did, though. I was equivocating about what it means to "agree that there are clear cases where one's genotype has profound effects on one's psychology". I figured you didn't mean something like Down's Syndrome, but rather something like the propensity to commit crime. I figured you meant that simply because no one denies that Down's Syndrome is caused by something going wrong with one's genes. But I see now that you did indeed mean to include things like Down's Syndrome. If that's all it amounts to, then I fully endorse your second premise.

Ever beaten a dog, Ilion?

But let's keep in mind that the "genotype" is not a strictly material cause. Insofar as Aristotelian distinctions are in play, genes are not merely material and nothing but.

When we are talking about a substance, a complete "thing", a whole being, matter and form refer to _prime matter_ and substantial form. But prime matter has nothing of organization in it, it is wholly potential. Prime matter is simply the principle of individuation, by which one member of the species is a different unit from another member, and provides none of the organization or formation of the individual.

We sometimes sloppily tend to equate "body" with "matter" but when the matter is prime matter this is inaccurate, every body that we see or know is a body that is already informed, and is a body of some specific kind of being, and therefore is not matter simply.

Thus, when you speak of the genes of a human being, you are speaking of a body with reference to a principle of organization, and that means a body with form. The genotype is NOT, simply, a material cause.

"Yes, my genotype makes me a male human being."

But genotype also fine tunes things. For example, taste and smell,

"Can sweet-tasting substances trigger kind, favorable judgments about other people? What about substances that are disgusting and bitter? Various studies have linked physical disgust to moral disgust, but despite the rich and sometimes striking findings these studies have yielded, no research has explored morality in conjunction with taste, which can vary greatly and may differentially affect cognition. The research reported here tested the effects of taste perception on moral judgments. After consuming a sweet beverage, a bitter beverage, or water, participants rated a variety of moral transgressions. Results showed that taste perception significantly affected moral judgments, such that physical disgust (induced via a bitter taste) elicited feelings of moral disgust. Further, this effect was more pronounced in participants with politically conservative views than in participants with politically liberal views. Taken together, these differential findings suggest that embodied gustatory experiences may affect moral processing more than previously thought."

http://pss.sagepub.com/content/22/3/295.short

"Disgust is a fascinating emotion. Its elicitors are a puzzle: it makes sense that we are disgusted by things that can contaminate our food, but why does this food-related emotion extend itself so deeply into our social world, so that people feel disgusted by certain ethnic groups (or by racism), by homosexuality (or by homophobia), and by a variety of social and moral violations that don’t involve anything physically contaminating?"

"Disgust appears to play a role in moral judgment, moral conflict, and ethno-political violence. (For the best work on disgust and politics, see David Pizarro.) Disgust has clinical ramifications, for it seems to be involved in obsessive-compulsive disorder and in a variety of phobias. (For the best work on clinical implications, see Bunmi Olatunji.) Disgust even has religious ramifications, for it appears to be part of the psychological foundation of culturally widespread ideas of purity and pollution. Many religions (e.g., Judaism, Islam, and Hinduism) have extensive rules for regulating human bodily processes and keeping them separated from sacred objects and practices. Disgust appears to provide part of the structure of these rules and practices."

http://people.virginia.edu/~jdh6n/disgustscale.html

Tony: "But let's keep in mind that the "genotype" is not a strictly material cause. Insofar as Aristotelian distinctions are in play...."

This is an interesting point.

As an aside, were the biologist Aristotle alive today, he'd most certainly be a Darwinist. As Aristotle's philosophy is deeply influenced by the biology of his day (even his political theory, which is based upon empirical observations of various political traditions, that states that different forms of government are better suited for different groups of people), so his philosophy today would probably be influenced by modern findings. One of the remarkable things about Aristotle is how undogmatic he is.

As Aristotle's philosophy is deeply influenced by the biology of his day (even his political theory, which is based upon empirical observations of various political traditions, that states that different forms of government are better suited for different groups of people), so his philosophy today would probably be influenced by modern findings. One of the remarkable things about Aristotle is how undogmatic he is.

That seems darned trivializing to me, MAR. It starts out sounding like you're saying there is some particular agreement between Aristotelian and Darwinian ideas, and then it ends up just saying that Aristotle would have believed whatever is the mainstream view of the day, presumably even if it _disagreed_ with his earlier ideas.

Now, I myself think Aristotle was putting forward something like a hybrid between philosophical and scientific views, and insofar as his was a scientific view, it's turned out that those demmed atomists were to a surprising extent right after all. I would like to think that Aristotle, as an empirical kinda guy, would have changed his mind. But I'm not going to be dogmatic about that. And insofar as I say, "I'd like to think Aristotle would have come to see what structural facts underlie the 'forms' and would therefore have come more to resemble an atomist," this is just a hope. It isn't a denial that this would have involved a change of views on his part! Same thing, mutatis mutandis, for the eternity of the universe.

As for Darwinism, well, saying that Aristotle would have been a Darwinian is a compliment to Aristotle only if Darwinism is exceedingly strongly supported. Since I doubt that, I don't really think that's such a compliment. Makes Aristotle sound more just like a "go with the flow" guy.

As Aristotle's philosophy is deeply influenced by the biology of his day

MAR, I am not aware that there was any really established theory of biology in his day for Aristotle to have been significantly influenced by it. I thought he was pretty close to being the leading biologist around: he actually made attempts to observe things.

The rest of your comment is presumptive in the extreme. If Aristotle was a good thinker, and were transported to today, he would have taken the modern world evidence into account in formulating both his thoughts about biology and about philosophy. Because there are modern thinkers - philosophers and physicists and biologists - who call themselves Aristotelians and make the case that Aristotle's thinking can be squared with current data - I cannot make a presumption that Aristotle would have produced a deeply different system of thought than the one that he did produce, were he alive today. And I doubt that you have a shred of substance to back up such a presumption either.

Al, haven't we known for millenia that changes in the body will effect changes in judgment? A person with a dyspeptic condition and a dyspeptic attitude often judges people differently than he would were the dyspeptic situation went away.

Why should we think that the senses cannot have a similar effect? Or, were you looking at the world through rose-colored glasses before now?

Tony, we haven't known for millennia that taste and smell are genetically determined. Also, it appears that what we may consider to be reactions driven by finely tuned, philosophically driven moral and religious sensibilities may be nothing more then a genetically determined reaction to certain stimuli. That possibility is different from the mood swings due to an upset stomach.

"it appears that what we may consider to be reactions driven by finely tuned, philosophically driven moral and religious sensibilities may be nothing more then a genetically determined reaction to certain stimuli."

And wouldn't this imply that our analysis of these phenomena may itself be nothing more than a similar genetically determined reaction? If such is the case how then do we avoid the Underground Man's "man as organ stop"?

Tony, we haven't known for millennia that taste and smell are genetically determined.

Al, please, stick to what the evidence shows: that taste and smell are genetically influenced. "Determined" has a rather farther-reaching meaning, and the evidence doesn't get us there, not now anyway.

Also, it appears that what we may consider to be reactions driven by finely tuned, philosophically driven moral and religious sensibilities may be nothing more then a genetically determined reaction to certain stimuli.

I like that: "nothing more than". String one statement beyond its real evidence, stretching influence into "determination", and then string that into another conclusion that is too far to reach by actual logic. I suppose, Al, that the experiments actually proved that every time each of the subjects made a choice, that they were doing NOTHING more than following the dictates of their senses under genetically determined stimuli-response mechanisms, and that the moral evaluation was actually a complete mirage. Because, of course, the experiment was able to establish the absolutely complete causal chain of each choice. Right?

Or, maybe, we can escape out of dreamland and get back to reality again: our choices are made in an ocean of stimuli, influences, and inclinations, of which we have only indistinct understanding of perhaps about 3 to 5% of the total, sometimes less. We might actually know more than 5% on occasion, but since we haven't seen the far shore with the eyes of science, we cannot tell how large this ocean is.

As an aside, were the biologist Aristotle alive today, he'd most certainly be a Darwinist.

MAR,
Darwin's theory of natural selection is as old as the hills. Aristotle knew all about it. In fact, he raises the issue as a difficulty in his Physics:

A difficulty presents itself: why should not nature work, not for the sake of something, nor because it is better so, but just as the sky rains, not in order to make the corn grow, but of necessity? What is drawn up must cool, and what has been cooled must become water and descend, the result of this being that the corn grows. Similarly if a man's crop is spoiled on the threshing-floor, the rain did not fall for the sake of this-in order that the crop might be spoiled-but that result just followed. Why then should it not be the same with the parts in nature, e.g. that our teeth should come up of necessity-the front teeth sharp, fitted for tearing, the molars broad and useful for grinding down the food-since they did not arise for this end, but it was merely a coincident result; and so with all other parts in which we suppose that there is purpose? Wherever then all the parts came about just what they would have been if they had come be for an end, such things survived, being organized spontaneously in a fitting way; whereas those which grew otherwise perished and continue to perish, as Empedocles says his 'man-faced ox-progeny' did. (Physics, Book II, chapter 8)

He goes on to reject this thesis on the grounds that it denies the nature of things, which it certainly does.

I've heard that there is nothing new under the sun.

George R: I'm sorry, but I don't see a theory of se--al selection or natural selection spelled out in the passage you cite above. Not. Even. Close. I could go read it in the Greek, but I suspect that I won't find it there either.

The off-the-cuff statement I made only suggested that Aristotle was in essence an biologist and that, were he alive today, his philosophy would probably be influenced by modern biology, esp. evolutionary thought, which actually compliments many of Aristotle's insights (such as his politics, where he claims that different forms of government are better suited for different groups of people). I seriously cannot imagine that a contemporary Aristotle would ideologically reject Darwinism and side with fundamentalists or the Cultural Marxists at the Discovery Institute. It's risible to think he would, although it might make for a good Onion piece.

George, MAR also denies the nature of things.

What would an evo-informed ethics look like? For starters, we'd probably have to start talking about "human natures" and not "human nature."

Of course, what he implies is that there is no such thing as a settled "nature" of a species, which is just what Darwin himself said.

Tony,

Contemporary research is showing that there are "human natures," and not just a single "human nature." If you stand back and think about it, this makes perfect sense. It has nothing to do with what X or Y says, but with the nature of things, which you and others seem to want to deny.

See a good summary:

http://evoandproud.blogspot.com/2011/08/can-evolutionary-psychology-evolve.html

George R: I'm sorry, but I don't see a theory of se--al selection or natural selection spelled out in the passage you cite above. Not. Even. Close.

That's too bad, MAR.

Oh, by the way, here's someone who did see it:

Aristotle, in his 'Physicae Auscultationes' (lib. 2, cap. 8, s. 2), after remarking that rain does not fall in order to make the corn grow, any more than it falls to spoil the farmer's corn when threshed out of doors, applies the same argument to organization: and adds (as translated by Mr. Clair Grece, who first pointed out the passage to me), "So what hinders the different parts [of the body] from having this merely accidental relation in nature? as the teeth, for example, grow by necessity, the front ones sharp, adapted for dividing, and the grinders flat, and serviceable for masticating the food; since they were not made for the sake of this, but it was the result of accident. And in like manner as to the other parts in which there appears to exist an adaptation to an end. Wheresoever, therefore, all things together (that is all the parts of one whole) happened like as if they were made for the sake of something, these were preserved, having been appropriately constituted by an internal spontaneity, and whatsoever things were not thus constituted, perished, and still perish. We here see the principle of natural selection shadowed forth, but how little Aristotle fully comprehended the principle, is shown by his remarks on the formation of the teeth. (Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, 6th edition) [emphasis mine]

George,

N.B. my operational word 'theory'. As you quote, Darwin says "We here see the principle of natural selection shadowed forth." Aristotle didn't articulate a theory of natural selection, but foreshadowed an aspect of it, which he didn't seem fully to understand. (Aristotle was brilliant, so if he had better data, perhaps he would have beat Darwin to it.) Nonetheless, intuiting an aspect of something and a mature, articulated theory are two different things. Nonetheless, we're probably not in complete disagreement, as I suspect that people for a long time have intuited certain aspects of natural selection, probably since humans began the process of artificial selection with dogs, livestock and horses 10,000 years ago.

Here are 2 quotes from MAR's link.

Even when assessed on its own terms, the Pleistocene EEA looks more and more like a myth, and should be treated as such:

Is a paradigm shift in the offing? Probably. But what form will it take? Perhaps the second question is unimportant. Whether evolutionary psychology changes or disappears, we’ll be looking at evolution and human behavior in a very different light.

When evolutionary psychologists themselves say that the previously widely-recognized, established model is "more like a myth", we laymen can be forgiven a bit of "I told you so" after they have been saying it sounds more like a myth to them for some time. The paradigm may be shifting. It's got a ways to go.

Contemporary research is showing that there are "human natures," and not just a single "human nature." If you stand back and think about it, this makes perfect sense. It has nothing to do with what X or Y says, but with the nature of things, which you and others seem to want to deny.

MAR, "I don't think that word means what you think it means." Or at least, not how it is typically used around here. If there are several populations of humans of various strains, they cannot be called different species if they can interbreed and have fertile offspring. As far as I know, all groups of humans can interbreed and have fertile offspring.

"Nature" encompasses something common to all of the members of a species. It makes no sense whatsoever to speak of different natures of 2 animals or people who can produce fertile offspring. If they are different sub-species, then they will have differences that are determinable, maybe marked. But these differences will not be different natures.

I have no idea what kind of "nature of things" you think I am trying to deny, but I strongly suspect that what you are really doing is running with Darwin's underlying thesis that there is no such thing as a "nature" of a species, where nature means what it meant for 2 millenia before Darwin.

I seriously cannot imagine that a contemporary Aristotle would ideologically reject Darwinism and side with fundamentalists or the Cultural Marxists at the Discovery Institute.

Yes, but you also cannot imagine that a contemporary Aristotle would scientifically reject certain forms of Darwinism (like materialist versions) and side with the scientific Christians who insist that whatever forms of evolutionary theory may be valid, certain forms are unsupported by the evidence and are "more myth" than science. The fact that you cannot imagine it says nothing about its validity. But all in all, your risible attempt to co-opt Aristotle in the absence of ANY actual evidence of "what he would say" is part and parcel with the rest of the so-called argument for socio-evolution.

George, nice quote.